The Assignment Game: Decentralized Dynamics, Rate of Convergence, and Equitable Core Selection

We study decentralized learning dynamics for the classic assignment game with transferable utility. At random points in time firms and workers match, break up, and re-match in the search for better opportunities. Agents have no knowledge of other agents’ strategies, payoffs, or the structure of the game, and there is no central authority with such knowledge either. We propose a simple learning process that converges to stable and optimal outcomes (the core). A variant of the process, where sometimes the firms exhibit greater price stickiness than the workers and at other times the reverse holds, is shown to converge in polynomial time. If payoffs are perturbed a subset of the core with a natural equity interpretation is selected.

Biography
Dr. Bary Pradelski is a game theorist who is interested in distributed learning, bounded rationality, and stochastic processes. He is currently a postdoctoral researcher at ETH Zurich in the Department for Computational Social Sciences.Bary was educated in Mathematics at the TU Munich, Ecole Polytechnique Paris, and the University of Oxford from where he received his doctorate under the supervision of Prof. Pierre Tarrès and Prof. H. Peyton Young.